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IC 74-1747

8 August 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: **Acting D/DCI/IC**
SUBJECT: **Use of Post Mortem by OTR**
REFERENCE: **Memorandum attached**

1. I suggested to [] that OTR might wish to use our published Post-Mortem Report on the Middle East crisis of last fall. I gave him a sanitized copy (one which omits the highly classified section on collection) of that report to look over, and his response (favorable) is attached.

2. I think you should bless this enterprise and also suggest that we make the same offer to DIS. If you concur, I will get back in touch with Don and will see about arrangements with DIS.

Richard W.

[]
AC/PRD/IC

STAT

Attachment

Distribution:

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[] mjs

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DCI/IC 74-058

17 MAY 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Net Assessment
Office of the Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: Intelligence Support During the Middle East
Crisis of October 1973

Andy:

1. Thank you for sending along a copy of your memorandum of 18 April on the above subject. As you know, we have given considerable thought and study to the community's performance during the Middle East crisis, and have produced an interim post-mortem on the subject which was circulated. We are continuing to review the matter, however, to draw from it lessons which might be useful for the future. Your memorandum will be a very useful input to this process, which I have asked General Graham to follow up on.

2. I was particularly interested in your comments about the Watch Committee. I have a similar feeling that this Committee's efforts have become somewhat patterned and that a new look might be made at it. I think in terms of a regular projection of political and economic as well as military problems lying ahead. In fact, I think that broadening the Watch function can bring about a greater focus on early strategic, especially political, warning so as to generate counteraction and eliminate the necessity to face military problems further downstream. I have asked General Graham to make contact with the various elements of the community now looking at the warning process, to include the NSSM 242 exercise, some work by Dr. Hall, (ASD(I)), and some work within the various elements of the intelligence agencies themselves. Your thoughts will be useful in connection with this effort, and we will be in touch with you.

W. E. Colby

W. E. Colby

LTG Graham/wel/1May74
Rewritten: Mr. Colby/wel/16May74
DIST:
Orig-Addee
1-DCI
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Routing Slip

74-14201

TO:

		ACTION	INFO.			ACTION	INFO.
1	DCI	/		11	LC		
2	DDCI			12	IG		
3	S/MC			13	Compt		
4	DDS&T			14	Asst/DCI		
5	DDI			15	AO/DCI		
6	DDM&S			16	Ex/Sec		
7	DDO			17			
8	D/DCI/IC	/		18			
9	D/DCI/NIO	/		19			
10	GC			20			

SUSPENSE

Date

Remarks:

What kind?

Encl. Retyped for your
sig
16 MAY 1974

5/15/74

MEMORANDUM FOR: ^{of} Director, Net Assessments Office
~~Office of the Secretary of Defense~~

SUBJECT : Intelligence Support During the Middle East
Crisis of October 1973

Rudy -

1. Thank you for sending along a copy of your memorandum of 18 April on the above subject. As you know, we have given considerable thought and study to the ^{community's} performance during the Middle East crisis, and have produced an interim post-mortem on the subject which was circulated. We are continuing to review the matter, however, ^{to} ~~and~~ draw from it lessons which might be useful for the future. Your memorandum will be a very useful input to this process, which I have asked General Graham to ~~continue to follow up on.~~

2. I was particularly interested in your comments about the Watch Committee. I have a similar feeling that this Committee's efforts have become somewhat patterned and that a new look might be made at ^{it} ~~this~~. I think in terms of ~~relating the~~ activities of the Watch Committee more closely to those of the various Watch Officers but also to a regular projection of political and economic as well as military problems lying ahead. In fact, I think ^{that} ~~that the~~ broadening ^{early especially} of the Watch function can bring about a greater focus on strategic political, warning ^{so as} to generate counteraction ~~in this field~~ and eliminate the necessity ^{to} ~~of facing~~ military problems further down stream. I have asked

General Graham to make contact with the various elements of the ^{community} ~~Government~~ now looking at the warning process, to include the

NSSM 242 exercise, some work by Dr. Hall (ASDI) and some work within the various elements of the intelligence agencies themselves. Your thoughts will be useful in the connection with this effort, and we will be in touch with you.

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Net Assessment,
Office of the Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: Intelligence Support During the Middle East Crisis
of October 1973

Thank you for your memorandum on the same subject of 18 April 1974. The points brought out in your memorandum parallel very closely those you have already seen in the intelligence community post mortem on the same subject matter. The Intelligence Community Staff is preparing additional papers on the subject and your memorandum has been referred to General Graham as an input to the process.

W. E. Colby

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INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF SUMMARY

INTERNAL COORDINATION			Action Officer: Title and Signature
Officer	Action	Initials	
ES			LTG Daniel O. Graham, USA D/DCI/IC
DCI	For signature		
			Phone Number <input type="text"/> 8 MAY 1974
			Subject: Report from Andy Marshall's Office on Middle East Crisis

Summary

1. This is easily recognized as the one-man post-mortem of the Middle East crisis by Captain George Pickett, USA, on Andy's staff. The problem really isn't in Andy's bailiwick anymore and Captain Pickett has overstated his case rather badly in several places.

2. I do not recommend a detailed response to this memorandum, rather a polite thank-you and an indication that it has been referred to the post-mortem people as an input.

3. Attached is a memorandum to that effect from the DCI to Mr. Marshall. Recommend your signature.

Daniel O. Graham
Lieutenant General, USA
D/DCI/IC

Attachment

18 April 1974

cy to PRG Watch

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

22 April 1974

Memo For Lt. Gen. D. O. Graham, CIA

Attached is a copy of a memorandum I recently sent to the DCI on deception which you may find of interest. Last week we also sent Colby a copy of the Executive Summary of the report, prepared by a member of my staff, that evaluates intelligence support during the Middle East crisis. (Attached)

Andy Marshall

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WHEN WITH ATTACHMENTS

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Next 6 Page(s) In Document Exempt

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